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of influenza A virus in swine
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Abstract
Background: Influenza A Viruses (IAV) are endemic pathogens of significant concern in humans and multiple
keystone livestock species. Widespread morbidity in swine herds negatively impacts animal welfare standards and
economic performance whilst human IAV pandemics have emerged from pigs on multiple occasions. To combat
the rising prevalence of swine IAV there must be effective control strategies available.
Main body: The most basic form of IAV control on swine farms is through good animal husbandry practices and
high animal welfare standards. To control inter-herd transmission, biosecurity considerations such as quarantining of
pigs and implementing robust health and safety systems for workers help to reduce the likelihood of swine IAV
becoming endemic. Closely complementing the physical on-farm practices are IAV surveillance programs.
Epidemiological data is critical in understanding regional distribution and variation to assist in determining an
appropriate response to outbreaks and understanding the nature of historical swine IAV epidemics and zoonoses.
Medical intervention in pigs is restricted to vaccination, a measure fraught with the intrinsic difficulties of mounting
an immune response against a highly mutable virus. It is the best available tool for controlling IAV in swine but is
far from being a perfect solution due to its unreliable efficacy and association with an enhanced respiratory disease.
Because IAV generally has low mortality rates there is a reticence in the uptake of vaccination.
Novel genetic technologies could be a complementary strategy for IAV control in pigs that confers broad-acting
resistance. Transgenic pigs with IAV resistance are useful as models, however the complexity of these reaching the
consumer market limits them to research models. More promising are gene-editing approaches to prevent viral
exploitation of host proteins and modern vaccine technologies that surpass those currently available.
Conclusion: Using the suite of IAV control measures that are available for pigs effectively we can improve the
economic productivity of pig farming whilst improving on-farm animal welfare standards and avoid facing the
extensive social and financial costs of a pandemic. Fighting ‘Flu in pigs will help mitigate the very real threat of a
human pandemic emerging, increase security of the global food system and lead to healthier pigs.
Keywords: Swine, Influenza, Pandemic, Disease control
Background
Influenza viruses are significant pathogens of humans,
livestock and a multitude of wild species. They have a
diverse and complex ecology stemming from their ability
to cross species barriers. Comprising four genera within
the Orthomyxoviridae family, Influenza A Virus (IAV),
Influenza B Virus (IBV), Influenza C Virus (ICV) and
Influenza D Virus (IDV) are enveloped virions with
segmented negative sense RNA genomes (Fig. 1a).
Seasonal epidemics of IAV and IBV occur in humans
whilst only IAV has been attributed to cause epidemics
in swine [1]. IBV [2], an ICV-related pathogen [3, 4] and
IDV [5] have been reported and associated with mild
morbidity in domestic pigs [4, 6]. Herein, the focus will
be on IAV due to its more significant historical impacts
© The Author(s). 2021 Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if
changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons
licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons
licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain
permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the
data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated in a credit line to the data.
* Correspondence: hamish.salvesen@roslin.ed.ac.uk
The Roslin Institute and Royal (Dick) School of Veterinary Studies, University
of Edinburgh, Easter Bush, Edinburgh, UK
Salvesen and Whitelaw Porcine Health Management            (2021) 7:23 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s40813-021-00196-0
and greater potential for emergence as a swine or human
pandemic.
As in humans, swine infections with annual epidemic
strains are generally associated with high morbidity and
low mortality [7]. Swine IAV (swIAV) causes respiratory
illness that is clinically characterised by fever, loss of ap-
petite and coughing. These symptoms cause weight loss,
which significantly affects the productivity of growing
pigs and the reproductive performance of breeding sows
[7, 8]. An epidemiological meta-analysis determined the
global pig and herd-level seroprevalence as 49.9 and
72.8%, respectively. A significant proportion of the over
1.4 billion pigs in 2018 have therefore been affected by
swIAV [9, 10]. Because swIAV is usually observed as a
component of Porcine Respiratory Disease Complex
(PRDC), the reduced productivity and animal welfare from
swIAV infection are compounded by pathogenic co-
infections [11, 12]. The presence of viral infections are a
significant influence on the profitability of a farm [13].
In the USA, costs per finishing pig were estimated to
be $10 when PRDC co-infections are considered, repre-
senting a significant loss of income [14]. The major eco-
nomic concerns for hog farmers from swIAV stem from
the reduced productivity that entails a longer time to
slaughter and the lower number of average piglets per
sows in IAV endemic herds [15]. A German study identi-
fied that 80% of farms with clinical presentation of swIAV
had reduced reproductive performance prior to imple-
mentation of a vaccination program and found higher
abortion and preweaning mortality rates that result in the
average of piglets weaned per sow annually being reduced
by more than one, a factor that will seriously impact the
economic performance of affected farms [8].
The 2009 pandemic H1N1 (pH1N1) outbreak,
eponymously named “Swine ‘Flu”, provides a warning of
the potential damage to the pork industry of indirect
costs that are incurred from swIAV zoonotic transmis-
sion. Furthermore to the direct costs, public misconcep-
tions about the safety of eating pork and concerns of
sustained swine to human transmission caused losses to
the US pork industry estimated to be over $1 billion
USD [16] and a reduction in Mexican GDP of over $3.2
billion USD [17] was incurred from trade embargoes
and consumer abstention. These examples demonstrate
the fragility of consumer pork demand in the instance of
a swine origin pandemic outbreak.
The IAV genome consists of 8 RNA segments that en-
code for at least 12 proteins (HA, NA, PB1, PB1-F1, PB2,
PA, PA-X, NP, M1, M2, NS1, NEP) [18, 19]. Nomencla-
ture for IAV derives from antigenic subtypes determined
Fig. 1 The current and prospective strategies available for influenza A virus control
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by the major surface glycoproteins haemagglutanin (HA)
and neuraminidase (NA). The genomic architecture of
IAVs is essential to understanding its history and contin-
ued evolution in intraspecies and zoonotic scenarios. In
the instance of two distinct IAVs co-infecting a single host
cell, genomic segments can become reassorted, leading to
antigenically novel viruses budding, with progeny virions
having a different genomic composition to the ancestral
infectious particles [20, 21]. Termed antigenic shift, this
phenomenon supports rapid generation of novel IAV sub-
types, that in turn promotes the circumvention of the host
immune response by evading recognition [22].
Genome reassortment alone does not drive IAV
emergence, with the error-prone viral RNA-dependent
RNA polymerase (RdRp) contributing through the
introduction of mutations during RNA replication [23].
In a constant evolutionary arms race between IAV and
their hosts, the adaptive pressure exerted by host im-
mune systems upon the virus is the response that stim-
ulates IAV phenotypic diversity and ultimately drives
their evolution. Lacking a proof-reading function, diver-
sity in the viral genome gradually accumulates, provid-
ing a source of variation for the forces of natural
selection to be imposed on, in a process known as anti-
genic drift (Fig. 1b) [24]. The viruses that can transmit
between hosts and replicate within a host most effi-
ciently then become pervasive by superior propagation.
Understanding the genetic evolution of IAV is critical
to disrupting the IAV ecosystem and determining the
approach of controlling both intraspecies and zoonotic
transmission.
Livestock species, primarily pigs and chickens, and the
persistent IAV natural reservoir of wild waterfowl play a
central role in the ecology of IAV. The close phylogen-
etic relationship of chickens and waterfowl means that
there are fewer biological hurdles for avian IAV zoonotic
events. Opportunity for cross species transmission arise
in scenarios such as wild birds mixing with free range
chickens, with the regular global movements of birds on
migratory travel allowing widespread dispersal [25].
However, avian adapted IAV subtypes face greater bar-
riers for transmission into mammalian species due to
biological differences between hosts. For example, a well
characterised barrier to avian IAV transmission to
humans is the reduced capacity of avian adapted strains
to bind to and enter human epithelial cells effectively
[26]. The IAV glycoprotein HA binds specifically with si-
alic acid (SA) to trigger receptor mediated endocytosis
entry into host cells. The prevalent SA isoforms in
humans (α2–6) and chickens (α2–3) are well charac-
terised determinants of species specificity, with specific
amino acid changes in HA of avian derived IAVs being
associated with an increased potential for the emergence
of a human pandemic [27, 28].
The respiratory tract of pigs has both α2–6 and α2–3
on the surface of epithelial cells, creating the opportun-
ity for both avian adapted and mammalian adapted IAVs
to enter the same cellular environment [29, 30]. In the
occurrence that multiple IAV subtypes concurrently in-
fect a single host cell there is the potential for novel viral
emergence by antigenic shift, which has led to pigs being
coined as “mixing vessels” (Fig. 1c) [31, 32]. Spill overs
of avian origin IAV into porcine hosts occurs frequently,
however transmission between pigs is then limited with-
out further mammalian adaptations [33]. This is because
following successful entry of IAV into the host cell,
Fig. 2 Schematic diagrams of influenza A virus and its evolution. a) The influenza A virion is an enveloped virus containing 8 negative sense
singlestranded RNA segments. b) Genetic variation accumulates in the IAV genome during RNA replication. c) Novel IAVs can arise through
reassortment of the 8 genomic segments during co-infection of a single host
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other key steps including transport of viral RNA into the
nucleus [34, 35] and replication of the viral genome
within the nucleus [36–38] require adaptations to the
host environment. Because of IAVs error-prone RNA
replication, beneficial genetic changes can be rapidly ac-
quired in the new host if completion of the full viral
cycle is possible. The infectious ability of IAV is associ-
ated with signature amino acid substitutions that are
acquired following zoonotic transmission [39].
For 80 years there was a single known strain of swIAV
in North America, the 1918 H1N1 strain (cH1N1). Our
inability to control swIAV in a globalised world has pro-
vided the basis for further evolution and divergence into
distinct clades within each subtype. H3N2 emerged in
1998 as a result of triple genome reassortment with HA,
NA and PB1 from human seasonal influenza, PB2 & PA
from and avian IAV and NP, M1, M2, NS1 & NEP from
cH1N1. The acquisition of this triple reassortment gene
cassette (TRIG) has driven further emergence of mul-
tiple strains (H1N1, H1N2 & H3N2) that are now glo-
bally endemic in pigs [9, 40]. H3N1 has emerged most
recently in Europe, Asia and the United States but has
not yet been associated with large outbreaks [41–43].
The outbreak of pH1N1 in 2009 brought the role of
pigs in IAV ecology to the fore. Despite their role not
being clearly understood, it was quickly appreciated
that the human-swine interface played a major role not
only in regard to the original emergence, but through
continued bidirectional swine-human transmissions
[44]. Distinct antigenic derivations emerged in North
and South America, Asia and Europe as a result of di-
vergent evolution following establishment in local
swine populations [21, 40]. Regional divergence and
reassortment events of pH1N1 exemplifies how genetic
drift and selective sweeps affect the evolution of IAV
[45]. Recent examples of further swine-human trans-
mission include an H3N2 strain containing the pH1N1
matrix protein (M1) that has largely been detected in
attendees of agricultural fairs in the USA, and seroposi-
tivity in Chinese swine workers against a novel strain
reassorted from avian-like H1N1 and pH1N1 identified
[46, 47]. Given that these examples are from regions
with existing swIAV surveillance infrastructure, where
bidirectional human-swine IAV transmission has not
been identified it should be considered whether it is
genuinely a case of it not occurring or whether it has
just not yet been detected.
With pig farming becoming more industrialised to
meet consumer demands for pork, the higher density of
pigs is likely to increase swIAV prevalence if left uncon-
trolled [9]. Close and regular interactions between
swIAV endemic pigs and humans creates an environ-
ment that could lead to the emergence of novel strains
through bi-directional transmission and subsequent
reassortment events [48–50]. Furthermore, the limited
but present international trade of pigs and global move-
ment of people exacerbates this potential for co-
infection with multiple distinct IAV strains [51, 52].
In this review we consider current and prospective
control strategies that aim to reduce the prevalence of
swIAV across all pig farming systems in the face of these
increasing threats (Fig. 2). Each farming system will have
differing practicalities and cost/benefits prospects for
each method, and therefore it is only suggested that
farms implement the maximum that is possible in an ef-
fective way within their system should be done to con-
trol swIAV.
Current control measures
To control the spread of swIAV, the number of onwards
infections must be reduced to be below 1 per infected
animal. The number of onwards infections per animal in
an entirely susceptible population is known as an R0
value. If it is below 1 the pathogen will subside in a
population. Control strategies can be reactive, which aim
to clear a virus infection after clinical presentation or de-
tection, or proactive, which aims to prevent a pathogen
becoming established. With swIAV having an R0 value
of 10.66 it will rapidly spread in if no control programs
are implemented [53]. Effective control is vindicated
through improved future economic performance on
swIAV free farms as a result of better productivity effi-
ciency and reduced veterinary costs.
From a human health perspective, the reduction in
swIAV prevalence will lower the potential for the
emergence of a pandemic, which have historically had
huge societal and economic impacts. Controlling IAV
in swine should be approached with ‘One Health’
considerations due to its significant role in humans,
livestock and the environment (wild species). As a
quintessential zoonotic pathogen, successful control in
one species will have knock-on effects throughout the
swIAV ecological web. All control measures discussed
here refer to their application in farmed pigs, as al-
though wild pigs are infected [54–56] they cannot be
managed in the same manner and the low prevalence
and minimal interactions with humans or pig farms
means they present a low risk. Reduced swIAV preva-
lence may also benefit by less erroneous use of antibi-
otics due, which has unfortunately been rising
alongside industrial farming practices [57].
Animal management
The most basic swIAV control strategy is through
evidence-based animal husbandry methods that will con-
comitantly benefit animal welfare standards. Animal
management control measures are most effective when
applied pre-emptively to prevent swIAV establishment
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rather than retrospectively to clear an endemic outbreak
[58, 59]. With high levels of subclinical presentation and
variable results from medical interventions, once an out-
break has begun it can be difficult to intervene.
In favourable conditions, such as in cold water or with
cold temperatures on a hard surface, IAV can remain in-
fectious outside a host for beyond a year [60, 61]. The
increased persistence in water is particularly relevant as
Mastin et al. (2011) [58] observed reduced odds ratios
for swIAV in pigs where there were less than 18 fin-
ishers for each water access. The main route of trans-
mission postulated is via droplets [62–64] during
physical contact with another pig or from contaminated
surfaces, so it is expected that increasing the incidences
of nasal contact and the sharing of mucus will assist the
perpetuation of swIAV. As follows, the size and density
of pig herds is a risk factor for increased prevalence [65–
67]. Furthermore, overcrowding creates stressful condi-
tions that can lead to a depression of the immune
response that increases the susceptibility and severity of
swIAV across a herd [68]. The type of farm and housing
system also plays a role in swIAV epidemiology. Mea-
sures such as using straw for bedding as opposed to hav-
ing a slat floor system have been associated with a lower
seroprevalence [58, 65], whilst indoor housing [58] and
open partitions between pens in barns [69] have been as-
sociated with an increase. With indoor housing, slat
floor systems and high-density herds increasingly com-
mon, these factors may contribute to the increasing
swIAV prevalence observed on pig farms.
Effective animal management includes collecting data
on husbandry and animal movements for use in support-
ing effective trace and isolate protocols as required. If an
outbreak occurs, movement restrictions can then be ap-
plied quickly, but only if appropriate information is
available to make an informed decision. Regarding
movements, fallow periods for pens are recommended
but are not realistic to apply in economically optimised
systems. More feasible is sanitation of pens between
groups with disinfectants that inactivate viruses to en-
sure transmission does not happen between groups on
arrival in a new pen. Disinfecting pens further benefits
by killing other pathogens of PRDC [70]. In a worst-case
scenario, the culling of entire herds and having a fallow
period to clean farms is a viable method of animal man-
agement to eradicate disease, however the repercussions
of eradicating pigs could not be more detrimental finan-
cially or emotionally to farmers. These drastic measures
were taken in response to pH1N1 in only Norway and
Egypt, primarily as preventative measures for swine-
human transmission, however it was not considered
widely effective as human-human transmission was sig-
nificantly the main source of infection [71]. In 2009 the
World Health Organisation (WHO) announced that
trade restrictions on pigs or pork products were un-
necessary, but reflecting this decision with our current
knowledge that bidirectional transfer can occur, the con-
tinued movement of pigs which disseminated the virus
between pigs [44, 72] may also have posed a limited but
present threat to humans who had close contact with
swine farms.
Biosecurity
As well as on-site management of animals, swIAV con-
trol must account for how multi-site pig systems require
regular movement of pigs between stratified breeding
farms through to finishing farms. Intuitively, movement
of an infected animal into a naïve herd is a primary
source of infection, and so once pathogen free status is
attained the aim is to prevent reimportation. To reduce
the likelihood of swIAV establishing in a naïve popula-
tion from new arrivals, quarantining before mixing with
the original herds is recommended since the presenta-
tion of clinical symptoms occurs subsequently to the
peak of time of viral shedding [73]. Given that many ani-
mals are asymptomatic carriers that present subclinical
infections [7, 74, 75], a lack of visible symptoms should
not be considered definitive confirmation of no infection
and excuse of quarantine before clearance for herd
integration.
All-in-all-out systems would reduce the risk of new
arrivals becoming infected; however, the logistical
complexity and dynamism of pig breeding does not
lend itself to this being practical. If the breeding
farms pathogen status is known, receiving farms can
appropriately have either confidence or mitigation
strategies in place. Given the time and cost of using
the available diagnostic tests, and the potential for
subsequent infection between testing and movement,
quarantine is the most effective blanket measurement
to take for new arrivals.
Observations that higher replacement rates are associ-
ated with higher seroprevalences of swIAV outlines the
potential risk of farming with high replacement rates
that are inherently necessary in multi-site farming sys-
tems [66, 69]. However, the impact of replacement is
not well defined, as data from swine belt states in the
USA observed no reduction of endemic swIAV preva-
lence associated with the closure of breed to weaning
herds, suggesting further work is needed to understand
whether inter-herd transmission or within herd trans-
mission is the main driver infectious cycles [59].
The inherent movement requirements of multi-site
production systems mean the entire system is more effi-
cient with higher localised farm densities to reduce
transport costs and permit hubs of abattoirs and feed
production. Although beneficial for ease of coordination
and economic efficiency, proximity to other hog farms
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and density of pig farms has been positively associated
with increased swIAV seroprevalence [66, 67]. An un-
seen risk of farm density is present in barn exhaust air
that has purportedly been detected to still contain
swIAV over 1 mile away [40]. With multi-site pig pro-
duction systems expected to become increasingly popu-
lar, these conditions that are more permissive to swIAV
transmission will lead to a higher prevalence [9]. Beyond
regional boundaries, international transport of live pigs
encourages the global dissemination of swIAV [72, 76,
77], with North American and European swIAV lineages
now circulating in China and Africa [43, 44].
Biosecurity control strategies should not be limited in
their focus to pigs. Workers on swine farms are regu-
larly handling pigs and there is therefore potential for
transmission of IAV between pigs and humans [44, 50,
78]. If an employee or pig is infected with an endemic
strain to their species and then a zoonotically transmit-
ted strain, genomic reassortment can occur. Restricting
entry onto pig farms of only essential people (e.g vets,
employees, suppliers), ensuring all employees and their
families are vaccinated, and implementing good hygiene
across all farm practices will help reduce the risk of bi-
directional transmission and the emergence of a novel
strain by zoonoses [79]. Good hygiene practices include
wearing Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and
strictly enforcing ill employees not to attend farms. A
lack of biosecurity measures can be seen to have an ef-
fect as agricultural fairs in the USA are an identified
hotspot for swine-human transmission [9, 46, 80]. The
close contact required for showing pigs, minimal at-
tempts at mitigation compared to the farm setting and
the mixing of pigs from distinct origins creates the ideal
opportunity for IAV strain admixture and bidirectional
transfer.
Biosecurity protocols should also consider the threat
of IAV infections from beyond humans and pigs. There
have been instances of what were thought to be swIAV
free herds in well ventilated and secure barns detecting
avian influenza strains [81–83]. It was noted following
detection of avian IAV strains in these herds that they
use surface water from nearby ponds to clean out the
pens between replacing stock. As the surface water was
used by ducks and other waterfowl species that are
known to excrete IAV in their faecal matter, it is plaus-
ible the water acted as the vector for IAV transmission
[60, 61]. The biosecurity hazard of pooling water near-
by, especially when used as a resource for cleaning pens
exemplifies that anything entering a pig farm could be
considered a risk for swIAV introduction.
For small scale holders the practical biosecurity mea-
sures differ from indoor systems. Although indoor hous-
ing systems have been observed to assist in harbouring
endemic swIAV [9], on outdoor farms there is a scenario
of not being able to exclude other IAV susceptible ani-
mals such as birds, cats and mustelids which creates a
cauldron for IAV mixing from multiple hosts. However,
for either farming system, knowing where breeders come
from, quarantining new arrivals, receiving information of
the previous owners swIAV management protocols and
maintaining good hygiene practice where possible will
contribute to reducing the prospect of swIAV becoming
endemic.
Surveillance
Because of the low mortality, high morbidity and gen-
erally self-limiting nature of swIAV infections, it is
not considered as a notifiable disease by the World
Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) or the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) [84, 85].
However, surveillance data optionally collated does
help to understand the epidemiology and evolution of
swIAV and can be applied to inform policy decisions.
Because of its diversity and intrinsic mutability, know-
ledge of the prevalent genetic and antigenic landscape
enhances the effectiveness of control measures in
place. The more we understand about swIAV, the
more targeted control measures can be. Up to date
information on swIAV’s distribution and prevalence
also plays an important role in ensuring that current
vaccines remain relevant to the prevailing endemic
strains [86].
Although knowledge acquired from surveillance does
not directly control swIAV, the timely sharing of vir-
ology and epidemiology data to identify infection hot-
spots and transmission events within and between
herds/species, allows us to gain insight into where novel
strains are likely to emerge and respond to prevent fur-
ther transmission and establishment in a population [80,
86]. Because of this the USDA established a national
swIAV surveillance program after 2009 [87] and Europe
followed suit with the European Surveillance Network
for Influenza in Pigs (ESNIP) [88]. Further supporting
surveillance is the establishment of OFFLU (www.offlu.
net), a collaborative effort of experts on animal influenza
aiming to promote animal influenza research and data
sharing that is supported by the OIE and FAO [89].
Given that the dynamics of swIAV infections have been
reported to be both cyclical as in humans [59, 90], and
persistent throughout the year [91], we should be aware
that swIAV epidemiology is not necessarily directly
translatable from human research.
Despite the overt swine health and swIAV control
benefits derived from mass surveillance, efforts are
sometimes impeded by concerns that public knowledge
of the distribution or identification as a swIAV hotspot
would reduce consumer appetite for pork products and
damage the pig industry’s reputation. Concerns are also
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raised that even with the knowledge there is no cheap
and genuinely reliable treatment and individual farms do
not directly feel the benefit. If the surveillance data is
held privately because of these concerns, it is only useful
for understanding swIAV in a particular herd. Collabora-
tive efforts will contribute much more to efforts to con-
trol swIAV by the pig farming community.
Surveillance data can be from simple diagnostics such
as clinicopathology and post-mortem assessment of a
carcass, however, these methods are limited by not pro-
viding definitive detection of IAV [86]. For more reliable
results, molecular diagnostic tools can assess viral anti-
gens, nucleic acids or host antibodies that bind swIAV.
Quantification of swIAV RNA by Reverse Transcriptase
quantitative PCR (RT-qPCR) from a nasal swab mea-
sures the current viral load. Using conserved primers the
RT-qPCR assay can accurately and relatively rapidly de-
tect a broad range of swIAV subtypes [86]. Downstream
sequence analysis of amplified viral RNA can also pro-
vide insights into the evolution of swIAVs detected and
can easily identify genomic reassortment if the full gen-
ome is sequenced [51, 92]. The falling costs and increas-
ing ease of nucleic acid sequencing makes it increasingly
attractive as a detection method as it has broader bene-
fits of providing insights into the evolution and epidemi-
ology of swIAVs as well as the capacity to identify
genomic reassortment events. Current infections can
also be detected with non-nucleic acid assays such as an
enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) or during
post-mortem by immunostaining fixed tissues for swIAV
antigens [93].
ELISA can also be utilised to retrospectively assess
whether pigs have recently been infected with swIAV
[86, 93]. Antibodies circulating in blood plasma can be
detected from 1 to 2 weeks post infection and peak after
4–7 weeks [94, 95]. Other retrospective swIAV tests such
as the haemagglutination assay and serum neutralisation
assays are not available commercially and therefore less
relevant for widespread surveillance but have been dem-
onstrated to be effective at distinguishing endemic
swIAV strains [94].
A major limitation in testing for serum antibodies to
swIAV compared to RT-qPCR is that vaccination stimu-
lates an antibody response and a vaccinated animal cannot
be discriminated from a naturally infected animal [86].
Current surveillance measures are also limited because
commercially available diagnostic tests are presently only
available for specific H1N1 and H3N2 subtypes [86].
Medical strategies
The application of medical strategies to reduce the
prevalence of swIAV is a complementary tool to the
traditional strategies and should not be considered a
substitute. The epidemiological data from surveillance
must be considered to assist the targeted application of
medical strategies. Prophylactic treatment for swIAV is
performed by individual farms to remove endemic
swIAV and thereby improve the productivity of their
pigs, however if applied effectively, its broader benefits
will contribute to a reduction in the likelihood of trans-
mission between farms, as well as the potential for reas-
sortment and zoonotic transmission [53, 96, 97].
Vaccination
The principal prophylactic strategy for controlling
swIAV is vaccination. As demand for pork products in-
creases, pig production has intensified, and with this the
uptake of vaccination to reduce swIAV has as well. After
the 2009 Swine ‘Flu outbreak vaccine uptake improved as
pig farmers moved to negate the threat of another zoo-
notic event occurring that had outlined the fragility of
consumer confidence in pork consumption and the eco-
nomic impacts of a swine origin IAV outbreak [16, 98].
The ability of swIAV to evolve by antigenic shift and
antigenic drift complicates the creation and vaccine
design process, making it essential that effective surveil-
lance is in place to ensure optimal vaccine design. Vac-
cination has been observed to reduce the reproduction
ratio (the number of secondary infections caused by an
infected animal) in naïve pigs from 10.66 to below 1,
making it an effective strategy for swIAV control [53].
Vaccination for swIAV in swine principally works by in-
ducing the production of virus-specific antibodies via a
humoral adaptive immune response which has two
mechanisms of function; through antibodies circulating
in the host serum that neutralise/opsonise infectious
swIAVs and through priming the host immune system
to clonally produce antibodies following the detection of
the epitope [99]. All licensed vaccines that are currently
commercially available are inactivated whole viruses that
target the major porcine endemic strains H1N1, H1N2
and H3N2 in various combinations prepared with oil-
adjuvants [100]. Because Europe and North America
swIAV differ significantly in genetic and antigenic
composition, even of the same HA and NA subtype/no-
menclature, they must be designed for the prevalent re-
gional strains [101].
The major challenge to effective Influenza vaccination
is swIAV’s complex ecology and incessantly mutable
genetic and antigenic composition [100]. The more
closely matched the vaccine and infectious strain are the
better the immune response will be [102] and antibodies
will only bind to closely matched target epitopes, thus if
a mismatch between the vaccine strains and the infect-
ing swIAV strain is present, serum antibodies will fail in
neutralising the infectious virions. HA is by far the most
abundant viral protein, comprising about 80% of IAV
membrane proteins [103] and is highly accessible to
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antibody binding as a protruding protein. Because of
this, the modus operandi associated with whole inacti-
vated swIAV vaccine mounted responses is to produce
antibodies that target the exposed head region of the
HA protein [104–106]. Antibody binding with HA inter-
feres with its ability to bind to the host receptor SA, pre-
venting endocytic uptake and therefore viral infection
and transmission. However, as the exposed head region
of HA is heterogenous (25% genetic distinction within
subtypes) and has a high mutation rate, positive selec-
tion of swIAV that do not have an HA match with an
antibody promotes evolution of swIAV virions that cir-
cumvent the vaccine induced immune response [24].
This evolution is a major cause of low vaccine efficacy
rates and reason why vaccines must continually be up-
dated and modified to match circulating strains. If anti-
bodies target a more conserved region, such as the stem
region of HA they will have activity against a broader
range of swIAV and assist in counteracting the circum-
vention of host immune systems by swIAV evolution
[107]. Antibodies have been identified in humans that
cross react with the HA stalk region of pH1N1 and also
divergent H1N1 and H5N1 influenza strains, suggesting
that an effective vaccine could mimic this response in
humans at least [108].
Nucleoprotein (NP) and M2 have been considered for
vaccine efficacy, however the smaller amount of protein
and their localisation make them difficult to effectively tar-
get using whole inactivated virus technology [109, 110].
The ultimate goal for Influenza control is for a universal
vaccine with reactivity against all strains, however even for
humans this is not on the immediate horizon [111].
Using different strains of swIAVs for subsequent vaccin-
ation has been observed to protect against both strains
better than concurrent bivalent administration [112], how-
ever the complexity of distributing specific vaccines strains
to different farms/regions for use at specific times makes
heterologous vaccination programs administratively diffi-
cult and so has led to the less effective but simpler bivalent
vaccines becoming ubiquitous. Although swIAV anti-
bodies wane annually and if present will not always match
subsequent strains due to HA evolution, there are sugges-
tions that swIAV specific B lymphocytes might be main-
tained over a pig’s life [99]. In humans, people vaccinated
with the 1976 swine-origin H1N1 strain showed a slightly
enhanced neutralisation response to the 2009 H1N1 pan-
demic, albeit in a small cohort [113].
The other major complication for vaccine efficacy is
the presence of maternal derived swIAV antibodies in
piglets. Typically, 2 doses of vaccine are given intramus-
cularly to gestating sows prior to farrowing. Although
no swIAV specific antibodies transfer through the pla-
centa, maternal antibodies in colostrum confers immun-
ity in neonates and with passive transfer from sows’ milk
immunity is usually maintained until around 14–16
weeks old [114, 115]. As neonates do not have a well
enough developed immune system to respond well to
vaccination this is the most effective way at preventing
new-born piglets of becoming a large reservoir for
swIAV. As the piglets’ maternal antibody titre declines,
susceptible piglets become a reservoir for swIAV, trans-
mitting to other pigs in the herd as their own antibodies
wane or the virus evolves [116]. Piglets in comprehensive
vaccination programs, are vaccinated at weaning, how-
ever the biological variation in reducing antibody titres
means that under this system a proportion of piglets will
either not have a well enough developed immune system
to respond to the vaccine or have no maternal derived
antibodies remaining well before vaccination, meaning a
naïve reservoir is likely to remain.
The presence of MDAs in piglets presents a conundrum
to the farmers. Kitikoon et al. (2006) observed that piglets
in their study which had MDAs also had increased infec-
tion rates and prolonged presence of clinical symptoms as
a result of suppressed serum antibodies and T-cell re-
sponse compared to piglets without MDAs [104]. An im-
paired humoral immune response has also been identified
after vaccination of piglets against Porcine Reproductive
and Respiratory Syndrome Virus (PRRSV) in the presence
of MDAs [117].
Furthermore, vaccine-associated enhanced respiratory
disease (VAERD) has been experimentally observed
whereby more severe disease is caused if the infecting
virus does not match the inactived swIAV strains con-
tained in the vaccine due to an obfuscated immune re-
sponse [118]. As the mechanism for VAERD is not well-
understood and it has only been observed under experi-
mental conditions, the consideration it should be given
when considering on-farm swIAV vaccination strategy is
contested and dependent on the vaccine type [119, 120].
There is a desire to move away from whole inactivated
vaccines due to their need for annual updating, incon-
sistent efficacy in the field and potential VAERD.
An alternative vaccine strategy that is increasingly
popular in US commercial settings are autogenous vacci-
nations, inactivated swIAV isolated from strains endemic
to the herd [96, 99]. The major drawback to autogenous
vaccines is that they are created from presently circulat-
ing strains, and pigs are therefore likely to be immuno-
logically naïve to any new swIAV introductions.
However, as commercial vaccines often have low efficacy
rates, up to date veterinary knowledge of local swIAV
epidemiology can mean autogenous vaccines offer an
improved solution to the endemic strains over the broad
based commercial vaccines [121]. In a longitudinal study
from the USA, there was no significant difference in the
reduction of swIAV in herds using either commercial or
autogenous vaccinations in sows, however as the
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autogenous vaccine strains used were not genetically
identified, mismatches between the vaccine strain and
circulating strains may have reduced the effectiveness of
the autogenous vaccination programs [122]. This under-
lines why it is important to have a robust swIAV surveil-
lance program prior to vaccination to target the right
strains and also post vaccination to evaluate if it has
been successful and whether the vaccination program
needs to be improved.
Vaccination programs in pigs are specific to porcine
endemic strains, and therefore will not prevent avian or
(most) human IAV strains from infecting pigs. Immunis-
ing swine farm employees is important to prevent hu-
man to swine transmissions, rather than preventing the
zoonotic transmission in to humans [44, 78, 123]. Redu-
cing the potential human-pig transmission diminishes
the risk of a swine endemic strain genomically reassort-
ing with the human strain and transmitting back to
humans. This was observed in 1998 events when swine
viruses acquired human genes, ultimately leading to the
emergence of novel swine viruses [80, 87]. Vaccination
of pigs against the classical H1N1 swIAV strain did not
prevent the emergence of pH1N1, and subsequent trans-
mission between humans and pigs has been identified
multiple times [44, 46, 72, 87]. The threat of a swine-
origin IAV pandemic emerging from reassorted strains
is epitomised with the repeated appearance of Swine ‘Flu
outbreaks [124]. With the occurrence of antigenic diver-
gence commercial vaccines need to updated to remain
effective against the novel strain. Given that the com-
mercial vaccines are most effective as trivalent concoc-
tions, the addition of another strain would threaten their
functionality [99].
Considering that effective vaccination programs re-
quire surveillance to be implemented fully effectively,
have a cost of labour with two intramuscularly adminis-
tered doses 3 weeks apart and are likely to entail veterin-
ary consultation, the development of vaccines with
broader heterospecific activity and efficacy are essential
to improving farmer uptake. Vaccination of piglets at
weaning is further complicated by the movement of pigs
between breeding and finishing farms, whereby swIAV
resistance in piglets does not directly benefit breeding
farms as they leave soon after weaning. This results in a
dichotomy in the incentives for vaccination between
breeders and growers in that the benefit is mostly re-
ceived by the grower of weaned piglets, but the breeder
would ideally vaccinate piglets to reduce the likelihood
of swIAV being transported between farms. If the re-
sponsibility of vaccination falls on the growing farms,
some piglets are likely to already be infected on arrival
and will act as a fresh source of swIAV. Because of this
there will always be susceptible pigs in the production
chain.
For vaccines to be adopted by farmers they need to be
cost effective or incentivised in an alternative manner to
ensure the broader benefits of controlling IAV ecology
are realised. It is notable that in countries that are
endemically infected with highly pathogenic avian influ-
enza there are blanket vaccination programs against
specific avian IAV strains across complex production
systems that could be helpful when considering a
framework of how to implement blanket swIAV pro-
grams [125, 126].
Pipeline control measures
The control measures described above work best when
applied with coordinated discretion. Likewise, novel
strategies for IAV control will operate most effectively
when integrated alongside traditional control strategies
that are prescribed and implemented in an accurate
manner. If infection is prevented, transmission is pre-
vented, hence IAV control is most effective when ap-
plied prophylactically. Reactive measures can only be
administered when symptomatic signs are seen in an
animal or at the herd level, and by that stage of the in-
fective cycle viral shedding has commenced, spreading
to naïve hosts who will continue the infective cycle. For
a virus that has high rates of subclinical infections the
optimal result is to entirely prevent infection, thereby re-
moving a reservoir for the emergence of a human
pandemic.
Genetic technologies
Genetic technologies offer the prospect of broad act-
ing, permanent and heritable resistance to swIAV.
Where vaccines are too expensive and there is poor
distribution infrastructure the possibility of resistance
by selective breeding could be particularly appealing.
However, there are no genetic markers currently iden-
tified in pigs that could be selected for via traditional
breeding programs. Genetic polymorphisms that con-
fer phenotypic resistance to swIAV must therefore be
introduced to breeding animals to provide the basis
for disseminating resistance by breeding. To reduce
the likelihood of mutation escape from genetic resist-
ance in the porcine host, using multiple genetic
methods for resistance is recommended to increase
the barriers to escape. The discussion of genetic tech-
nologies in this review is restricted to relevant viral
resistance examples in pigs and how they relate to
prospective swIAV resistance.
Transgenics
Transgenic pigs have been created using various genome
engineering technologies to develop in vitro and in vivo
porcine models for swIAV resistance. Here, a transgenic
animal is defined as one containing DNA not native to
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that species. Type I Interferon (IFN-I) is an important
mediator of the innate immune response to viral infec-
tions, and Mx1 (mice and pigs, MxA in humans) is an
integral downstream effector protein of the IFN-I anti-
viral response [127]. Allelic variants of Mx1 confer vari-
able susceptibility to IAV in pigs [128, 129]. Fibroblasts
isolated from transgenic pigs generated by Somatic Cell
Nuclear Transfer (SCNT) containing multiple copies of
porcine Mx1 cDNA were observed to have a 10-fold re-
duction in IAV titres compared to wildtype controls
[130]. IFN-induced Transmembrane Proteins (IFITM)
are virus restriction factors stimulated by the innate im-
mune response that inhibit cellular entry of several viral
pathogens [131]. Constitutive overexpression of porcine
IFITMs in a pig tracheal cell line was observed to reduce
IAV infection by Lanz et al. (2015) [132], whilst reduced
expression of endogenous IFITMs led to an increase in
viral titre. These findings were corroborated Benfield
et al. (2015), who reciprocated these findings specifically
for IFITM3 [133].
In the fight against PRRSV, Histone deacetylase 6
(HDAC6) has been identified as having anti-viral proper-
ties [134, 135]. Lu et al. (2017) [136] created transgenic
pigs overexpressing porcine HDAC6 and found PRRSV
gene expression was reduced and virus production im-
peded. These examples of transgenic animals are import-
ant in improving our understanding of how we can fight
viral infections and the knowledge on these proteins
may have applications related to therapeutic drugs. Be-
cause constitutively inducing an anti-viral innate im-
mune response is likely to have unintended biological
effects on the systemic health of the organism these
transgenic strategies are unlikely to ever be realised
commercially for ethical reasons.
RNA interference (RNAi)
A transgenic strategy more plausible in gaining regula-
tory approval would have specific antiviral activity as
opposed to inducing a systemic immune response. Ex-
pression of RNA interference (RNAi; short interfering
RNA, micro RNAs, short hairpin RNAs) products can be
introduced to knockdown transcription or translation of
key genes for viral infections [137–139]. In vitro research
has observed reductions in gene expression and subse-
quent impaired replication capacity for swine endemic
coronaviruses [140], Classical Swine Fever (CSF) [141],
PRRSV [142], African Swine Fever (ASF) [143], Foot and
Mouth Disease (FMDV) [144, 145] and IAV of swine
and avian origins with RNAi [146]. In vitro success has
been translated in vivo, with PPRSV [147], FMDV [148]
& CSF [149] transgenic pigs expressing short hairpin
RNAs (shRNAs) showing resistance to the relevant viral
infection. Importantly, Li et al. (2014) [147] only ob-
served an increase in the IFN-I response when foreign
viral RNA is detected and not constitutively against the
RNAi molecules. RNAi mediated immunity against IAV
has been developed in chickens [150], but has not been
demonstrated yet in pigs. However, the success in chick-
ens and the established use of lung specific promoters
for RNAi and its effectiveness against other viral patho-
gens in pigs suggest that it could be a potent inhibitor of
swIAV replication with minimal unintended biological
consequences. However, the highly mutable nature of
swIAV and its genetic heterogeneity would mean trans-
genic RNAi swIAV resistant pigs would need to target
multiple genes to reduce the likelihood of escape by mu-
tation and remain effective, which would increase the
risks associated with expressing non-native RNA prod-
ucts by the multitude of transgenic transcripts.
Despite being discussed for use in livestock dating
back to at least 2003 [151], it is clear that the promising
results of RNAi in research face significant hurdles in
transferring the technology to a commercial scenario for
public consumption. Delivering the RNAi technology
using nanoparticles [152, 153] or viral vectors such as
Adeno-Associated Viruses (AAVs) [154, 155] as a thera-
peutic as opposed to constitutive expression as a defence
against swIAV infection could be an alternative delivery
mechanism with less regulatory pushback to consider.
Transient delivery of RNAi moecules through these
methods would permit rapid therapeutic adaptation to
the genetic identity of swIAV strains diagnosed in par-
ticular regions and would reduce the potential for unin-
tended consequences such as resistance emergence and
off-target effects. However, despite the benefits of im-
proved productivity at the farm level and reducing the
burden of swIAV in pigs, using RNAi in a therapeutic
manner is reactive and would therefore create a reservoir
of persistent subclinical infections. For a more compre-
hensive review of the applications and risks of RNAi in
animal agriculture see Bradshaw et al. (2017) [139].
Gene-editing
A more viable strategy for permanent and heritable re-
sistance than creating transgenic organisms may be in
modifying endogenous host genetics to prevent viral ex-
ploitation of host proteins. In the microbial evolutionary
arms race of bacteria against viruses, we have discovered
a molecular mechanism in bacteria that prevents viral
infections in a targeted and specific manner. In its native
environment, the CRISPR/Cas system functions with a
programmable RNA probe that binds to viral nucleic
acids through homologous pairing. The RNA probe is
complexed with a Cas protein that cuts the target nu-
cleic acid, resulting in degradation of the viral genome.
We have extrapolated this microbial technology to cre-
ate an improved and adaptable gene-editing technology
that allows specific changes to be made to mammalian
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genomes in a time and cost efficient manner [156].
Gene-editing includes deletion of nucleic acids, substitu-
tion of nucleic acids or introduction of nucleic acids.
Larger scale genome engineering and epigenetic modifi-
cations are also possible using the gene-editing toolbox;
however, as described here it specifically does not in-
clude large non-native regions of DNA being introduced
as happens with transgenic animals.
Viruses require a host organism for replication and
transmission. This reliance on a host, usually specific in
type and/or organism, has led to the evolution of host
proteins being exploited during the virus life cycle. By al-
tering the DNA sequence of host genes that code for
proteins which are recruited by a virus, such as SA that
promotes swIAV endocytosis, we can perturb the viral
life cycle, confer resistance to the host and prevent on-
wards transmission. The crudest form of gene-editing
for viral resistance is to delete an entire gene or cause an
insertion or deletion (indel) in the coding sequence that
introduces a premature stop codon. Introducing an indel
into the coding sequence of host cell receptors that lead
to phenotypically null pigs has been demonstrated to
work effectively for viral resistance to PRRS [157–159]
and specific coronavirus strains [160].
A more nuanced approach to prevent PRRSV inter-
action with the host cell receptor, CD163, was taken by
Burkard et al. (2017) [161]. Here, they deleted an exon
of the CD163 gene that codes for the protein domain
that PRRSV specifically interacts with. Further research
of the biological impact of lacking this CD163 domain
has thus far identified no unintended biological conse-
quences [162]. The data has not been published for the
CD163 null pigs displaying PRRSV resistance and thus
unfortunately a complete comparison cannot yet be
made between the biological impacts of losing a single
exon or the entire protein of CD163. For IAV specific
resistance, the host cell receptor (SA) is less appropriate
as a target for gene editing due to its crucial role for
normal function [163].
A family of nuclear proteins, acidic nuclear phosphat-
ase 32’s (ANP32s) has been identified in chicken and
mammalian in vitro studies to have strong pro-viral ef-
fects by enhancing the efficiency of IAV genome replica-
tion [38]. Human ANP32 null cell lines ablate the
infection of swIAVs, and when porcine ANP32s expres-
sion is recapitulated with cDNA constructs the ability of
the virus to replicate is returned. These findings, corrob-
orated by avian and human in vitro results [164–166],
suggest that the conserved gene family of ANP32s sup-
ports viral RNA polymerase function and enhance the
efficiency of genome replication [167, 168]. Conservation
of IAVs exploitation means that successful resistance
could be against multiple IAV subtypes to variable
extents dependent upon the infected species and IAV
polymerase genetics [169]. Specific amino acids in ANP32
proteins that affect the function of viral polymerase activ-
ity have been identified to confer a similar reduction in ac-
tivity as the full loss of function mutations and offer
potential targets for substitution [166, 170].
Research and development of the CRISPR/Cas systems
has led to a revolution of gene-editing technologies. As a
tool for generating research models, Cas9 transgenic pigs
and chickens have been developed [171, 172]. Alterna-
tive Cas protein-based strategies include using Cas13
which endonuclease activity specifically associated with
RNA. A transgenic animal expressing Cas13 and guide
RNAs that target the swIAV genome could therefore
conceptually be more resistant to infection. Inactivated
Cas proteins that have transcription activating or repres-
sion domains fused could be therapeutically prescribed
to affect the expression of immune response genes [155].
Base-editing and prime-editing are more recent develop-
ments that have enhanced the specificity and make small
changes to the host genome have not been well assessed
in pigs but hold promise for reducing the potential for
unintended biological impacts [173, 174].
A major hurdle to the implementation of gene-editing
in livestock for disease resistance is gaining regulatory
approval and broad public acceptance [175]. From a
public health perspective for IAV it is difficult that the
application of genome-editing in livestock may only be
favoured retrospectively following an outbreak of disease
that may have been controllable in the primary instance
through genome-editing. Pigs that have no foreign DNA
are much more likely to be permitted for animal welfare
benefits and economic demands from producers, with
regulations in Argentina, Japan and Canada already hav-
ing legislated to regulate the animal and not the process
by which the DNA was altered [176, 177]. Therefore, if
the gene-edit has been validated to be benign other than
the intended effect they are likely to be allowed for pro-
duction. These positive steps towards regulatory accept-
ance alongside the development and optimisation of
gene-editing strategies that could be applied at scale in a
commercial setting [178] provide optimism for a case by
case approach to the acceptance of gene-edited
livestock.
Gene-editing could also be applied outside directly
editing the infected host genome for vaccine production
through changing the genome of chickens that lay eggs
used as bioreactors for the propagation of whole IAVs.
Ectopic expression of swine factors (such as SA or
ANP32s) that support the replication of swine adapted
strains in an avian environment could boost the effi-
ciency of replication in eggs, reducing the cost of vaccine
production and thereby potentially making uptake of
vaccination more accessible. A risk to gene-editing of
pigs comes from the corporate nature of pork
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production, meaning producers that are not integrated
with breeding companies offering IAV resistance alleles
in their population could lead to IAV risk farms being
isolated, causing small holder producers to be perceived
as less safe. The economic factions regarding the intro-
duction of new innovative technologies will hopefully
not impede improved safety for humans and welfare for
pigs from being available.
Novel immunostimulant strategies
As an alternative to genetic technologies, novel swIAV
control strategies being developed are focussed on im-
proving the host immune response through enhanced
adjuvants to improve delivery efficacy or alternative
vaccine mechanisms that will prime or induce the host
immune response [89, 179]. Innovative immune stimula-
tion strategies include novel swIAV vaccine strategies
aiming to induce cell-mediated immunity (CMI; T lym-
phocytes) alongside the antibody mediated response as
well as innate immunostimulation therapies. Much of
the research into swIAV vaccines piggy backs research
into human strategies, in particular research for a uni-
versal vaccine that would target all IAV strains. For a full
review on novel IAV control strategies in humans see
Wei et al. (2020) [180].
Live vaccines are effective, however because they carry
a risk of genome reassortment with coinciding infectious
swIAV they are not appropriate for commercial use.
Richt et al. (2006) [97] demonstrated their effectiveness
with a modified live-influenza vaccine based on an
H3N2 containing a Non-Structural 1 (NS1) gene ex-
pressing a truncated protein. The virus is greatly attenu-
ated in pigs as a result of not being able to suppress the
innate immune response without a functional NS1 [181].
Inoculation of pigs with the virus led to complete pro-
tection against H3N2 strains, however only partial pro-
tection against H1N1 strains, further demonstrating the
difficulties faced by swIAV heterogeneity.
The commercially available and autogenous vaccines
used in the pig industry are inactivated swIAVs and do
not typically stimulate extensive CMI, which is recog-
nised as being more effective against heterologous IAV
infections [182]. DNA vaccines circumvent these hurdles
as they stimulate both CMI and antibody mediated re-
sponses and can be polyvalent in nature by expressing
genes of multiple swIAV strains [183–186]. Further-
more, they are comparatively easy to manufacture and
DNA can be readily substituted to evolve with swIAV
heterogeneity [184]. Experimental results from Karlsson
et al. (2018) [187] provides continued promise of realis-
tic DNA doses and intradermal delivery strategies transi-
tioning DNA vaccines into a commercial setting.
Administering mRNA that encodes specific antigens of
interest has also been demonstrated in pigs to elicit a
humoral and cellular immune response [188]. Another
method of directing nucleic acids to epithelial cells of
the lung is through viral vectors such as recombinant
adenoviruses expressing swIAV antigens [189]. It is not
known whether these vaccine administration methods
will prevent the issue of VAERD but from the smaller
samples in research settings it is conspicuously
unidentified.
Nucleic acids may not be restricted to being vaccines
for therapeutic application. Co-administration of
interleukin-6 DNA was observed to enhance anti-IAV
activity in mice [183]. It has been observed that
SUMOylation changes at the genomic level occur fol-
lowing IAV infection [190, 191]. Schmidt et al. (2020),
identified that endogenous retroviral (ERV) expression is
enhanced by specific SUMOylation changes, and ERVs
that are usually epigenetically silenced are de-repressed
with IAV infection following epigenetic reprogramming
[192]. Expression of viral dsDNA, albeit endogenous, in-
duces a heightened immune response and is therefore
postulated to assist in clearing viral infections. Direct ad-
ministration of dsDNA to induce the same effect could
therefore be a plausible IAV therapy.
Not only are the vaccine stimulants important to im-
prove, but concentrated and timely delivery to lung epi-
thelial cells through improved adjuvants will improve
the efficacy of therapeutics. Currently, oil based adju-
vants are used with commercial vaccines to improve
their immunogenicity [89]. Intranasal administration of
immunogenic antigens with a porcine lung surfactant
and Poly I:C with inactivated virions have separately
been observed as effective in a research setting limited
to H1N1 inactivated virions [193, 194]. Intranasal deliv-
ery is further supported as a simple and effective
administration technique using nanoparticles as a deliv-
ery vehicle for M2 antigens [195]. Here, pigs developed
immunity to H1N1 through CMI without any detectable
antibody response observed. This suggests that combin-
ation therapies specifically targeting CMI alongside
humoral immunity could be effective.
The adoption and combination of new technologies
alongside novel administration methods that reduce the
skilled labour and costs required for vaccination will go
a long way to improving the uptake from producers and
assist in improving control of swIAV.
Conclusions
swIAV is associated with a considerable burden of dis-
ease in pigs that is associated with significant economic
effects and represents a major threat to human health.
The emergence of the 2009 H1N1 ‘Swine ‘Flu’ pandemic
is a warning of the dire impacts that pork production
and global food security could incur should a strain
emerge again from a porcine host as happened in 1918.
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With industrial farming practices increasingly adopted
and multi-site systems necessitating more pig movement
there will be more opportunities for viral reassortment
that enhances the potential for novel IAV strains to
emerge. Each approach will be variably relevant accord-
ing to different regions and the dominant farming sys-
tem, with the available local infrastructure affecting the
implementation of each strategy. Implementing effective
control measures to reduce the intraspecies and zoonotic
spread of swIAV will improve the economic perform-
ance of pig production, improve farmer and pig health
and negate the potential for pigs to act as a mixing ves-
sel for emergent strains of IAV.
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